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The requirement that radio users obtain the government's permission
in advance before transmitting has been a foundational feature of
communications regulation for about eighty years. However, the recent
regulatory expansion of "open" regimes for managing the electromagnetic
spectrum, such as the increase in license-exempt and "light" licensed
frequencies in several countries, may change all of that, and this prospect
has created excitement among observers of wireless telecommunications
and communication law. Garage door openers, cordless phones, and baby
monitors, it is hoped, were just the first kinds of "radio stations" one could
have without a license. Under open regimes, more people will have more
wireless devices in their hands than ever before, and they will be able to
use them in new ways. Proponents hope that more use, more efficient use,
and more application innovation will result. However, the fate of services
in these bands-and of the open spectrum model itself-now rests with
user behavior. As of this writing, no one is sure of the answers to basic
questions such as when (or if) these open bands of the electromagnetic
spectrum will become congested with too many users, if they will fail due
to congestion, or, more generally, what it is exactly that people will do with
these new wireless freedoms. While allusions to "tragedies of the
commons"' and their inevitability or avoidability have been widespread in
writing about license-exempt spectrum, little is empirically known.
In effect, license-exempt bands are a partial return to communication
policy's "state of nature"-what will people do without government? (Or,
more properly, what will people do when the role of government is
changed and the requirement for prior permission to transmit is removed?)
Using two case studies drawn from a larger project across six countries,
this Article considers the case of Wireless Internet Service Providers trying
to use "open" spectrum, and chronicles their successes and failures. It
shows, perhaps unsurprisingly, that when legal constraints are removed,
users make their own order and are bound by their own local and differing
standards of fairness and propriety. The topic of this Article could be
identified by the keyword "shared spectrum," used in the literature-but in
1. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Scl. 1243 (1968).
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what follows it is clear that sharing sits alongside selfishness, coexistence
with extortion, and formal law with kinship and neighborhood customs.
First, this Article will outline the theoretical approach embodied by
these observations, an approach grounded in the anthropology of law and
derived from Moore's process theory of law:2 here, glibly labeled
"telecommunications policy from below." Second, it will introduce
Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) and this project's methods in
studying them. Next, it will present two detailed case studies from 2003 to
2005. The first case study describes an entrepreneurial project in a small
city that never quite got off the ground because the spectrum never looked
empty enough, while the second focuses on a "war" between two
competing WISPs that evokes the world before the enforcement of radio
regulations-the "Wild West" of radio, as some have called it. Finally, this
Article will end by drawing conclusions about the future of open spectrum
regimes and the utility of studying the administrative law processes of
telecommunications with a process theory of law, or "telecommunications
policy from below."
I. TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FROM BELOW: THE THEORY
OF LAW AS PROCESS
If one is interested in the study of telecommunications policy, one
almost always assumes that the action can be found in bodies one would
identify as "policymaking" (legislatures and regulators), and that the
appropriate object of study is a law or ruling-or, more expansively, an
elite debate about one. Certainly the world outside these fora is crucial to
research on telecommunications policy, but the outside world makes its
entry via logical arguments in legal analysis, in descriptions of
technological changes, in ideal hypothetical cases, in secondary reporting
of market research, and in economic simulations of reason. Research on
telecommunications policy is in this way dominated by a philosophically
conservative approach to law-an approach encouraged structurally by the
political economy of the policymaking process.3
If inherent in all of these diverse approaches is an overarching
philosophy of law, the closest may be legal formalism. A policy researcher
never need mention that "the law" of interest is the law as it exists written
on a page or that the appropriate focus of a research project should be a
patriciate debate over a present or future policy. The analyst's goal is
usually to determine how a current or proposed law (on a page) is right or
wrong. Research in this tradition has produced useful and even brilliant
2. SALLY FALK MOORE, LAW AS PROCESS: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH (1978).
3. See, e.g., THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF
COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 113-162 (1996).
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work. However, although the experts toiling with such research are more
savvy than any layman about the intrigues and interpretations that surround
every line of formal law, these intrigues rarely appear in mainstream
analyses of telecommunications policy, and they are almost never the focus
of it.
In contrast, this Article takes a methodological approach derived from
4the anthropology of law, specifically Moore's theory of law as process.
This approach can be contrasted with other research on telecommunications
policy by two central differences: First, it considers the law as it appears in
the lives of people who are not policymakers. These lives occasionally
appear in formalist telecommunication "user studies," 5 but it is significant
that what is analyzed in other studies is the communication technology (as
in "telephone users" or "Internet users") and not the law. Telephone users
are studied so that the right law can be written. The right law will then
define the system that these telephone users use. "Yet although everyone
acknowledges that the enforceable rules stated and restated in legal
institutions, in legislatures, courts and administrative agencies, also have a
place in ordinary social life, that normal locus is where they are least
studied."6 That is, telephone and other kinds of users are also users of the
law. To care about this is not just to go looking for the same law in a
different place, but instead it is looking for a different law. That is, not the
telecommunications policy that is written, but the policy that you can get
away with. It is well known that only a rare few will ever encounter formal
legal proceedings, and even these laws oftentimes become operative only
when a certain kind of person claims to know about it and presses for its
enforcement.7 And so, telecommunications policy then is not just
responsible for systems and markets, it is also something that users (or
rather, people) directly think about, interpret, manipulate, and even create
in the course of their experiences with communication systems. This
framework's second departure from other approaches to
telecommunications policy then is that it takes as its object the intrigues
and interpretations that surround law. Indeed, without formalist law as an
object, this approach asserts that the surrounding impermanent perceptions
are in fact the substance of the law. The rules are whatever we believe the
4. MOORE, supra note 2.
5. See, e.g., Christian Sandvig, Public Internet Access for Young Children in the Inner
City: Evidence to Inform Access Subsidy and Content Regulation, 19 INFo. Soc'Y 171
(2003) (discussing previous user studies by this Author); Milton L. Mueller & Jorge Reina
Schement, Universal Service from the Bottom Up: A Study of Telephone Penetration in
Camden, New Jersey, 12 INFo. Soc'Y 273 (1996).
6. MOORE, supra note 2, at 55 (citing Paul Bohannan, The Difering Realms of the
Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33 (1965)) (internal citation omitted).
7. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 79.
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rules are, no matter what the law books say. Statutes are one way of talking
about rules and order, among many other ways.
Many precedents for this approach exist. Although Moore's theory of
law as process has not been employed in telecommunications, excellent
previous scholarship in communications policy has focused critically on the
political culture surrounding law. Perhaps most memorably, some scholars
have considered administrative agencies like the FCC as an interpretive
community, and have analyzed communications policy symbolically rather
than institutionally. There have also been approaches to law that are
methodologically similar to this one via oral history.9 Previous scholars
have rejected legal formalism by turning to the critical legal studies
movement,'o but here we will instead turn to socio-legal studies'"-a
pluralistic scheme for studying the law that is inclusive of legal
anthropology. 12
Indeed, it may be clearest to say at the outset that telecommunications
policy has always been ruled "from below" as much as from above.
Midwestern farmers in the first decades of the twentieth century were
running illegal telephone systems over barbed-wire fences and using their
farm kitchen as the exchange.' 3 In the 1960s, ordinary people with no
technical experience were using then-illegal network attachments in their
homes. 14 Commercial broadcasting was brought to the United Kingdom in
part by Radio Caroline and other commercial broadcasters intentionally
testing and even flaunting broadcast rules.15 Yet aside from some
discussion of radio pirates,'6  empirical analyses of these minor
telecommunications criminals do not typically appear in law journals.
8. STREETER, supra note 3, at 114-16.
9. See, e.g., Robert B. Horwitz, Broadcast Reform Revisited: Reverend Everett C.
Parker and the "Standing" Case (Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
v. Federal Communications Commission), 2 COMM. REv. 311, 313 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Thomas Streeter, Beyond Freedom of Speech and the Public Interest: The
Relevance of Critical Legal Studies to Communications Policy, 40 J. COMM. 43 (1990).
11. See, e.g., D.J. Galligan, Introduction, 22 J. L. Soc'Y 1 (1995).
12. See, e.g., Peter Just, Review Essay, History, Power, Ideology, and Culture: Current
Directions in the Anthropology ofLaw, 26 L. & Soc'Y REv. 373 (1992); see also Sally Falk
Moore, Certainties Undone: Fifty Turbulent Years of Legal Anthropology, 1949-1999, 7 J.
ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 95 (2001).
13. CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE TO
1940, at 43 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll-Telephone Service,
Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968).
15. Douglas A. Boyd, Pirate Radio in Britain: A Programming Alternative, 36 J.
CoMm. 83, 86 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Buck Endemann, Comment, Keelhauling Pirates: How Ex Parte Seizure
of Non-Interfering LPFM Does Not Further the FCC's "Public Interest," 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 661, 692-97 (2006).
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It is obvious that changing the penal code's sanction for (or definition
of) assault will not eliminate assault. Similarly, radio laws will always have
radio pirates. Indeed, manipulating the formal criminal law may define
illegality and change rules, penalties, and their enforcement, but all of this
may have little relation to what happens in your neighborhood. The same is
true for telecommunications policy, as this Article will show.
II. RETURNING WIRELESS TO ITS "STATE OF NATURE"
This Article considers the promise and viability of open spectrum
regimes by investigating how a few interlocutors make order in the
electromagnetic spectrum. The process theory of law would hold that
invoking law in a social situation is a way to symbolically communicate,
establish, maintain, or undermine order against a background assumption of
absolute indeterminacy." This way of thinking about law may have seemed
unnecessary to discussion of the electromagnetic spectrum until quite
recently. After all, it seems that order among users of the spectrum has
been solidly achieved by government regulation of the time, power output,
location, and frequency to be used by radio transmissions. Users of the
spectrum may have seemed like only second- or third-hand users of the
law, as their awareness of national spectrum allocation rules might have
been limited to the concept of a "channel" when turning the knob on an old
television set. Laws about spectrum allocation were fixed both in law
books and in tuned crystals, and there might have seemed to be little that
communicators could do to interpret or even interact with them.
But as alluded to in the Introduction, spectrum users are now being
expected to interact with each other and the spectrum in novel ways.
Unlicensed spectrum "parks"-like the U.S. allocation of 2.435-2.465
GHz'8 (most commonly used for "Wi-Fi" wireless data networking,
cordless phones, and other unlicensed uses)-confine all users to a narrow
slice of spectrum and dictate that users must accept whatever interference
results. Some scholars have advanced the prospect that the liberalization of
spectrum should continue such that most or all spectrum is open.19
The closest historical analog to this situation may be radio
broadcasting circa 1920 in the United States. At this time, although there
was something called a "license," there was no governmental enforcement
authority. All users had a limited choice of frequencies (all commercial
stations were at 360 meters or, after 1922, at either 360 or 400 meters),
17. MOORE, supra note 2, at 49.
18. 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.245-248.
19. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 HARv.
J. L. & TEcH. 25, 29 (2002) (providing a review and proposal of the liberalization of the
entire spectrum).
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faced power limits, and had to accept any interference that resulted. 20 At
first, within the overall framework of shared licenses, stations that
encountered interference made "simple agreements" and "handshake pacts"
with each other to reduce interference.2' Specifically, within the conditions
for transmission specified by the government, individual stations haggled
over the more limited options left open to them by federal law, creating
new norms, formal agreements, and informal agreements at the local level
that were within or even superseded the federal rules. 22 Stations arranged to
manipulate the times they transmitted (e.g., making voluntary frequency-
sharing schedules), the locations of their transmitters (e.g., dividing up the
transmission area amongst themselves), their power within the limits
specified by the government, and their frequencies within what the
government allowed. The U.S. Department of Commerce sponsored
24
conferences to encourage this kind of self-regulation from 1922 to 1925.
However, before long, "owners of stations who believed themselves to be
interfered with took matters in their own hands," leading "eventually to a
warlike atmosphere" 25 and ultimately the breakdown of order into chaos.
Although it is difficult to clearly see such a distant past, a common
interpretation among radio historians is that at some point, after the local
arrangements began to fail, all systems of order in the spectrum failed.
Stations "jumped without restraint to new wave lengths. . . [and] also
jumped their power"26 even beyond federal limits. "By the end of 1926 it
was impossible in most geographical areas to receive a consistent broadcast
signal" due to interference between stations.27 This crisis is the genesis
story of modem telecommunications regulatory agencies, which are often
described as born to bring order from this chaos.28 (Although this is a
received view of the creation of such agencies, that view has attracted
scholarly criticism. 2 9) The solution by 1934 was a much more rigid
20. See SUSAN J. DOUGLAS, INvENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING 1899-1922, at 316
(1987).
21. GEORGE H. DOUGLAS, THE EARLY DAYS OF RADIO BROADCASTING 92-93 (1987).
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 93.
25. Id.
26. 1927 FED. RADIO COMM'N. ANN. REP. 10-11,
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/MassMedia/Databases/documents-collection/270701.pdf.
27. DOUGLAS, supra note 21, at 95.
28. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KITTROSS, STAY TUNED: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 141-47 (2002).
29. See Robert Horvitz, Marconi's Legacy: National Sovereignty Claims in Radio, 1ST
COMMUNIA WORKSHOP ON "TECHNOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN" (2008),
http://www.communia-project.eulcommuniafiles/ws0lp_Marconis%20Legacy/20
National%20Sovereignty/o20Claims%20in%20Radio.pdf.
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allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum that largely eliminated shared
use of bands except among radio amateurs-centralizing the administration
of the spectrum and creating the FCC and its foreign counterparts.30
Today's unlicensed electronic consumer devices might appear to be
nothing like the radios of the 1920s. Yet the recent experience of users of
shared frequencies (now often called "open spectrum," "unlicensed," or
"license-exempt" regimes) show the striking parallels between 1927 and
today. Chiefly, the experience so far shows the widespread reappearance of
multiple interlocking and overlapping systems of rules derived from a wide
variety of sources of authority-federal administrative law, municipal
authorities, private mediators, bilateral contracts, friendships, rivalries,
family ties, and neighborhood norms. Multiple fields of rulemaking have
always existed, but they are now more salient.3' As federal policy has
thrown the spectrum open to "individual" firms and actors, it is clearer than
usual that this is the stuff from which individual action is knit. Proposals
for open spectrum now pose a question. Were the "broadcast wars" of the
1920s the interregnum between two regimes of order: the garden and the
license? Or was instead all of licensing (1934 to 2005) the interregnum
between two periods of open wireless: the broadcast wars of then and
today?
A. To the Trenches ofLicense-Exempt Spectrum
To consider the uses of more open spectrum, this Article turns to the
specific instance of wireless Internet. One of the most significant
developments in the use of license-exempt spectrum from 2000 to 2005 has
been the rapid emergence of a Wireless Internet Service Provider (WISP)
industry based on license-exempt spectrum-a frequent estimate is that
there are 3,000 commercial WISPs in the United States alone.32
30. See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.) (2006) (establishing the FCC).
31. In some contexts, the word "fields" automatically evokes Foucault. The connection
intended here is legal anthropology's semi-autonomous social field. See, e.g., Sally Falk
Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate
Subject of Study, 7 L. & Soc'Y REv. 719 (1973).
32. See, e.g., Marlon K. Schafer, Mandatory FCC Form 477 Info, WIRELESS INTERNET
SERVICE PROVIDERS Ass'N MAILING LIST (Feb. 2, 2006), http://www.mail-
archive.com/wireless@wispa.org/msg03551.html; FCC Form 477 Forum, BROADBAND
DSLREPORTs.COM, http://www.broadbandreports.com/forum/rl3791564-FCC-Form-477
(last visited Feb. 23, 2011). During this time period the Wireless Internet Service Provider
Association had 400 members in the United States. About 500 WISPs filed the FCC's Form
477, leading to concerns about underreporting. For a discussion of reporting, see Kristopher
Twomey, FCC Form 477, ISP-PLANET (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.isp-
planet.com/fixed-wireless/politics/2006/form 477.html. WISPA then conducted a survey of
sales by equipment manufacturers and subsequently estimated the total number of WISPs to
be about 3,000, a figure that was then accepted in the government and has been often
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Sophisticated users of the electromagnetic spectrum from this industry are
in an interesting position. They are frequently well-educated, technically
trained engineers within an established white-collar profession. If it is
possible to speak so broadly about the engineer's disposition toward the
law, it could be said that a person from this background is likely to be
exceedingly conscientious about following it, even though when the rules
about radiocommunication are strict, the engineer's own skills provide
ample means to bend or break them.
As an introduction to this industry's experience of the law, consider
Tim Pozar, an engineer with "traditional" radio experience and the
founding member of the Bay Area Wireless Users Group of San Francisco,
California. In 2002, Pozar wrote the definitive legal guide for the
emerging community of Wi-Fi engineers, and he began it with the
sentence, "I am not a lawyer." 3 4 The guide, titled "Regulations Affecting
802.11 Deployment," started as a presentation transcript posted to Pozar's
personal website and then became so well known that it was eventually
included in a popular wireless reference book as an appendix.3s A point
worthy of note about Pozar's presentation is that he approached radio
regulation like a quest: the law in this area was a distant thing that an
engineer would be unlikely to know but quite likely to break.36 In response,
Pozar conscientiously interviewed telecommunications lawyers and read
law books until he could produce a very comprehensive list of the relevant
sources of authority at different levels and agencies of government and also
their specific rules. His presentation included explanations of limits on the
height of towers, rules against swapping antennas between different
equipment manufacturers, a discussion of the risk of wireless networks
interfering with aircraft RADAR, the limit of a wireless worker's
maximum exposure to electromagnetic fields, and much more. 37 He
concludes by recommending "[c]oordination with other users"8 in
unlicensed bands, and it is this coordination that provides local order
without licenses.
repeated. See, e.g., John M. R. Kneuer, Deputy Assistant Sec'y for Comm. and Info., U.S.
Dep't of Commerce, Speech on Promoting U.S. Broadband Deployment and Economic
Growth at the Mississppi Technology Alliance Sixth Annual Conference on High
Technology (Nov. 9, 2005).
33. About, BAY AREA WIRELESS USERS GRoup, http://www.bawug.org/about/ (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
34. Tim Pozar, Regulations Affecting 802.11 Deployment (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.Ins.com/papers/partl5/Regulations Affecting_802_1 i.pdf.
35. ROB FLICKENGER, BUILDING WIRELESS CoMMUNITY NETWORKS, app. A, at 137-56
(2003).
36. See generally id.
37. Seegenerallyid.
38. Id. at 156.
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The case studies that appear below also reflect encounters with this
distant law. These cases arose from a comparative cross-national study of
WISPs in six countries: the United States, Canada, Ireland, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. For the larger project, sixty-three
groups were chosen that identified themselves as WISPs in 2003 and were
affiliated with the "open wireless," "community wireless," "municipal
wireless," or similar movements.3 9  This includes groups that call
themselves commercial, noncommercial, and governmental. The groups
range from the quite formal to the quite informal. To be included, the group
had to have a web presence in 2003. Extensive, ongoing participant
observation was conducted with two of these groups (one in the United
States, one in the United Kingdom), while members of an additional
sixteen groups have so far been visited at least once by researchers who
interviewed participants and organizers in an open-ended format.
Researchers also attended meetings (if possible) and received a tour or
demonstration of the network (if relevant). All groups (including the
remaining forty-five) were analyzed by quantitative and qualitative content
analysis of online material about them (often including extensive mailing
list archives). This larger project is ongoing and the case studies presented
below represent early results from the visits to those sixteen groups that are
worthy of considerable attention on their own. Names of the people, places,
and organizations involved in the following case studies have been
changed.
Methodologically, this approach could be characterized as interviews
with users of electromagnetic spectrum regulation, or more formally, what
Yin would term a holistic, multiple case study research design organized
around literal replication. 40 This Article will present material from two
cases, but other cases from this overall study have appeared elsewhere,4 '
and the research methods have been described in more detail elsewhere.42
III. CASE 1: MONROEMESH'S FAILURE TO SHARE
Monroe is a small city of about 210,000 people in the Midwestern
United States, and is a county seat.4 3 The main industries there are white-
39. Or in some cases, the groups were referenced on web pages about those terms.
40. ROBERT K. YIN, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: DESIGN AND METHODS (3d ed. 2003). In
Yin's terms, both case studies presented here represent failures of order (literal replication)
that were arrived at in different ways. See id
41. See Christian Sandvig, An Initial Assessment of Cooperative Action in Wi-Fi
Networking, 28 TELECOMM. POL'Y 579 (2004); Christian Sandvig, Wireless Play and
Unexpected Innovation, in DIGITAL YOUTH, INNOVATION, AND THE UNEXPECTED 77 (Tara
McPherson ed., 2008).
42. Christian Sandvig, How Technical Is Technology Research?, in RESEARCH
METHODS FROM THE TRENCHES 141 (E. Hargittai ed., 2009).
43. In the 2000 U.S. Census, Monroe's per capita income in 1999 dollars was about
Vol. 63490
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collar services (notably health, finance, and insurance), retail trade,
government, and education. (Monroe is known for its local university and
very high levels of education.) These industries are slowly displacing a
historical focus on light manufacturing in a period of economic growth that
has been continuing for over ten years. Monroe is set among very slight
hills. At the time the proto-WISP group that is the subject of this case study
was founded, high-speed wired broadband Internet service was already
widely available via cable modem and DSL, and prices were falling. This
case study is based on interviews with Terry and Dave in 2003 and 2004.
Terry and Dave are both white, well-educated men in their twenties who
decided to found a WISP in Monroe-optimistically named
MonroeMesh."
Terry is a local engineer with a passion for tinkering with wireless
equipment. Before founding MonroeMesh, Terry gained previous
experience with a rare, proprietary unlicensed wireless data technology
called RLAN.45 In the late 1990s, using twelve radios scavenged from a
friend's failed electronic coupon printing business, Terry built an RLAN
network in a small town near Monroe as a hobby. The network wirelessly
connected his friends to the Internet (via an ISDN line) and to a shared file
server. The connection served most anywhere within an area of about
fifteen square miles. Terry and friends then had mobile Internet
connectivity at a time when this was so rare as to be almost unknown.46
"We had an old Sparc 2 sitting at [a friend's] house with a 22-gig SCSI
hanging off it-that was our central depository. We had mp3s, video,
whatever we want," Terry said. "It was pretty kick ass."
This earlier technology, RLAN, used shared spectrum, but the other
users were encountered so rarely that the fact of spectrum sharing was not
especially obvious, and the high power of the RLAN radios gave an extra
feeling of security. "RLAN was so powerful that, if you were close enough,
$23,000. There are 3,000 people per square mile. 7.6 percent of the population has no
secondary school diploma.
44. The network did not use what is called "mesh" technology-an advanced
technique-but Terry and Dave had hoped to. In a typical wireless network there are
dedicated routers to relay traffic and end nodes that originate it in a configuration like the
hub and spoke of a bicycle wheel. In a home Wi-Fi network, for example, a dedicated
device called an "access point" acts as the hub (and as a router), while the connected devices
(laptops, game consoles, etc.) communicate only with the access point and not with each
other. In the more complicated mesh network configuration that was just emerging at this
time, every device could acts as a relay for other nearby devices and there may be no central
routers.
45. RLAN was a proprietary first-generation wireless product operated at 900 MHz. It
was developed by DCA, a company that was later acquired by Attachmate. RLAN was then
discontinued.
46. Metricom Ricochet, the only widely known mobile Internet company at that time,
did not serve Monroe.
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it would overload the front end on whatever tuner you had ... it was a very
robust, very good solution," Terry explained. When it ever became
noticeable that other users did exist and there was a technological skirmish
between systems, the skirmish was fine with Terry because his radios
always won. Once, in the manner of a confidential aside, he mentioned,
"We walked over the analog cell phones. You heard a clicking sound in
your earpiece if you were using a cell phone anywhere in town." He
paused, then continued, "I thought that was pretty cool."
The introduction of the first cheap "Wi-Fi" wireless Internet
consumer products in 1999 spurred new wireless networking projects
across the world.4 7 At the same time that Tim Pozar was getting excited
about Wi-Fi in San Francisco, Terry and Dave met in the city of Monroe
and formed a working group that included four other technically inclined
people interested in capitalizing on the new possibilities of unlicensed
spectrum. The initial goals of the hobbyists were carried over from the
earlier RLAN network: "I wanted to be able to drink beer and have my
PDA get me alerts from work," explained Terry. Dave added, "I wanted
Internet access out at the lake."
They soon conceived of a city-wide transport network that a variety of
local service providers could connect to and jointly pay for. For instance,
the local radio station could join and then use MonroeMesh's transport
network to link remote broadcasts (such as DJs or live music events) with
the studio. This was already being done with 900 MHz ISM band
equipment, but the radio station reported that because there were so many
other users on that band in town "that first leg was horrible-4hey could
rarely get more than voice grade communication." Dave and Terry saw the
possibility for higher-quality digital sound broadcasts if they moved over to
Wi-Fi. Additionally, a local Internet service provider (ISP) agreed to
connect to the network and provide a connection to the Internet with an
authentication scheme-the MonroeMesh city-wide network would then be
a way to connect to the local ISP from a laptop while outside (and without
dialing in or using any wires).
As a beginning, using their own money, the group built three nodes
on tall buildings in Monroe (including one at the radio station), and the
limited network functioned just as it was intended to. But as they planned
for the network's expansion, Terry and Dave had more and more
misgivings. Terry explained, "We did some surveying. In one instance, we
47. See Frangois Bar & Hernan Galperin, Building the Wireless Internet Infrastructure:
From Cordless Ethernet Archipelagos to Wireless Grids, 54 CoMm. & STRATEGIES 45, 52
(2004). "Wi-Fi" is a brand and not an acronym-as coined, it did not stand for anything. It
was meant to evoke the "Hi-Fi" or "high fidelity" of audio equipment. It is an industry
consortium's name for interoperating radios that comply with the IEEE 802.11 standards.
See id.
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were on top of [a particular] building, just looking around, and we found
ten, fifteen networks. All just hammering away. All just blasting away,
making noise. And in the same area! That's an issue."
Later along in the widespread adoption of Wi-Fi these numbers (ten
or fifteen) seem small and would not be a concern, but this was 2002. The
Wi-Fi equipment in question (an access point) usually sends out a signal
called a beacon even when it has no traffic. This "hammering away" almost
surely consisted of beacons detected by the site survey software Terry and
Dave were using. Packet data traffic like Wi-Fi (and all Internet traffic) is
notoriously "bursty"-seeing a few other users on the same band would not
mean the band was full of traffic, simply that others had set their equipment
to use that frequency if and when they had something to transmit. Both
Dave and Terry were well aware of the technical details of the
communications protocol; nonetheless, the electromagnetic spectrum felt
full to them, and the presence of fifteen other possible users was "an issue."
As another way to facilitate the sharing of spectrum, the Wi-Fi
communication standard calls for the band to be further divided into
overlapping channels in a way similar to older cordless phones-if a
cordless phone user heard static on one channel, the user could move a
switch on the phone to transfer to a different frequency. The same held true
for Wi-Fi.48 But Terry explained that regardless of the number of channels
there were, someone else might still be using them:
If I were to use any of the channels that are available to me, one to
eleven let's say. No matter what I've picked, I'm asking for loss.
There's no technical way I can avoid loss with the gear that I'm given.
Or I can get. Anything that we can find is going to fall down at some
point. And even though these [other] networks are not necessarily very
active, they're still producing traffic.
The notion of overlapping channels itself has been problematic for the
engineering community, as traffic on an adjacent or even nearby channel
implies some (though not complete) degradation in service quality. One
comment on a trade press article that appeared around this time stated
forcefully: "The 802.1 lb standard gives us 14 channels to work with, right?
Wrong! Sorry, it's really only three useful ones."49
The MonroeMesh group's hesitation in this case does not seem to be
48. For instance, the IEEE 802.1 lb standard defines fourteen channels; one through
eleven are used in the U.S., one through thirteen in most of Europe, and only channel
fourteen in Japan. Jim Geier, Assigning 802.11b Access Point Channels, WI-FI PLANET
(Feb. 11, 2002), http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/tutorials/article.php/972261.
49. This quotation comes from a comment that has since been removed. It was
originally posted on WI-FI PLANET. Id. For example, these channels would be one, six, or
eleven in the United States. The channels in 802.11 b center on frequencies in 5 MHz steps,
but a transmission is 22 MHz wide, meaning that transmissions on adjacent channels
overlap significantly. See id.
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about responding to interference, but sharing-the only sharing
arrangement acceptable to them would have been one without any
possibility of degradation whatsoever Dave explained:
You're sitting at a table with two network engineers that would rather
build nothing than to build something that doesn't work the way it
should. Because the user expects the network to be a utility. When they
turn on the light switch, the lights come on. When they call 911, the
ambulance is at their door. It's the same thing.
More critically, it seems that the notion of increasing the use of license-
exempt spectrum creates an irresolvable tension for some wireless
engineers-while municipal, community, and entrepreneurial groups like
this one sometimes state that they aim to "democratize" access to the
spectrum, their engineers hate the thought of sharing spectrum (or worse,
losing a spectrum war) to an unskilled, uncredentialed consumer who
purchased equipment at a local superstore and knows nothing about radio.
While this group and others state that they hope to rely on cheap consumer
equipment to reduce prices, their professional identity rebels at the idea of
using consumer-grade equipment-Terry and Dave noted archly that "it
makes no sense" to "use commodity equipment in an infrastructure role."
This tension between credentialed engineers and amateurs has existed since
the beginning of the idea of the spectrum.so
After their initial burst of activity, MonroeMesh experienced several
frustrations trying to negotiate for the placement of their radios on tower
sites. Terry and Dave were also astonished by the effect of the weather in
the Midwestern United States on their outdoor equipment. Next they
became disappointed at the limited reach and few features of the Wi-Fi
equipment when compared to Terry's more powerful RLAN radios of the
past. MonroeMesh ran out of steam and the group dissolved in 2004, with
three stations and twenty users, and without formally incorporating or
taking in any money. "Maybe twenty users wasn't enough to legitimate
[sic] me donating gear and doing all this work," Terry said. "I'm sorry for
being so cynical." Still, both Dave and Terry listed Wi-Fi experience on
their resumes, and both quickly moved on to higher-paid jobs working on
wireless systems-Terry with an out-of-state telephone company1 looking
to move into wireless; Dave in the IT department of a large organization.
A. The Engineer's Perception of Congestion and Beauty
The MonroeMesh case reinforces an important lesson about
technology-the need to pay due attention to the way things look as well as
50. See CAROLYN MARVIN, WHEN OLD TECHNOLOGIES WERE NEW: THINKING ABOUT
ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY 40 (1990).
51. Actually, it was a competitive local exchange carrier (CLEC).
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the way they work. Dave and Terry's experience of the electromagnetic
52
spectrum came to them from the user interface of their mapping software.
The popular software Netstumbler, for example, presents the user with a
list of detected networks where each new station identified is added to the
list as it is identified." No measure of the amount of traffic is shown. No
measure of the amount of traffic is shown. This means that Netstumbler's
screen could show fifteen networks nearby, yet they might all be silent.
Dave and Terry could see the spectrum as though it were "full" because
fifteen networks are listed on the screen. While national spectrum
regulators and the Wi-Fi protocol designers would see that same spectrum
as empty, they would be looking at it through a different portal.
Functionally, Netstumbler was open spectrum's user interface.
More significantly, when we look at the MonroeMesh case in order to
understand the many overlapping obligations governing Terry and Dave's
behavior, it is clear that their professionalization as engineers is the
controlling one. While this may not be so for Terry, for other engineers
who are now coming to wireless systems with a background in computer
software rather than in radio, the uncertainties of the radio environment are
traumatic. Terry and Dave did not want MonroeMesh to work as much as
they wanted it to be beautiful to engineers, and this couldn't be
accomplished within their other constraints. This suggests that a significant
obstacle for proponents of open spectrum may be the cultural connotations
of sharing and the socialization of engineers.
IV. CASE 2: THE PLANETREE FOREST SPECTRUM WAR
The next case study includes threats of litigation and (at the time of
interview) an ongoing government investigation. To permit the parties
involved to speak at all about these events (especially because the
electromagnetic spectrum enforcement community is so small, even across
six countries), this Article will not reveal which country of the six (United
States, Canada, United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand) is the
home of "Planetree Forest." While the cultures and laws of the six nations
vary, the actual national law in this case makes surprisingly little difference
to what happens in Planetree Forest.
This case study concerns the relationship between two WISPs, here
called TownNet and SATNet. The materials for this case study come from
interviews with the two cofounders of TownNet (Alan and Philip), a
52. For a further discussion of mapping, see Christian Sandvig, The RED Project:
Rendering Electromagnetic Distributions, VECTORS (Fall 2007),
http://vectors.usc.edu/projects/index.php?project-87.
53. NETSTUMBLER.COM, http://www.netstumbler.com/2007/04/17/about/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2011).
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private mediator working at a not-for-profit organization who was called in
to adjudicate the following dispute, and two government officials from the
national communications regulator who were in a position to be familiar
with the regulations relevant to the dispute. The lack of SATNet
interviews make the picture of events unfortunately one-sided, but the two
available parties (a SATNet employee and the SATNet founder) both
declined requests for interviews-probably for reasons that will become
clearer below. Public information about the dispute was also consulted. All
descriptions here refer to the time of the interviews: the middle of 2004. As
most of the information comes from TownNet interviews, the dispute will
be told from the perspective of Alan and Philip, the cofounders.
Planetree Forest has a lower unemployment rate than surrounding
areas and higher levels of education." The main industries are farming and
the light manufacture of furniture, precision machinery, and clothing, and
the landscape is marked by farms, river valleys, and fifty-four small towns
(the population of the largest is 3,000). At the time the two groups
described here began operations, only dial-up Internet access was available.
TownNet was the creation of Alan and Philip, two white, well-
educated professionals. Philip was a former telecommunications engineer,
and Alan was a manager. Both lived in Planetree Forest. They gathered
about six other local professionals-including two accountants, a
marketing manager, a property developer, someone from the municipal
govemment's IT department, and a telecommunications market
researcher-who were dissatisfied that no broadband Internet service was
available. They wrote a business plan that projected that they could build a
sustainable (break-even) service using the latest wireless technology with
about USD $50,000 for ten towns in Planetree Forest. At the time, large
telecommunications carriers had publicly claimed that it was not profitable
enough to deploy broadband service in Planetree Forest. In response to a
national policy to accelerate the deployment of broadband in rural areas,
government subsidies were available from several agencies at different
levels of government. Alan and Philip of TownNet received a zero-interest
loan of about USD $5,000 and quit their jobs. They subsequently received
an additional $50,000 in the form of a state-level development grant and
expanded the network to include sixteen towns. However, TownNet was
not the only group interested in using new wireless technology to bring
high-speed Internet to Planetree Forest.
54. To protect the confidentiality of the TownNet founders, the government officials
were not told that the interviews were in reference to the specific dispute.
55. The area ranks in the eighty-ninth percentile for per capita income when ranked
against other areas in the country. There are 348 people per square mile. 21.9 percent of the
population has no secondary school diploma.
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A. SATNet and the Informal Spectrum Negotiation
Another company, SATNet, operated on a for-profit basis and was
run from a town outside the area. SATNet's founder had previous
experience in information technology, and SATNet had been providing
Internet service to hotels when they saw an opportunity to provide wireless
Internet service in Planetree Forest. Both SATNet and TownNet offered
very roughly comparable wireless Internet service,s6 and both designed
their network to use license-exempt bands for many necessary links
(although both also used other bands). Note the neighborhood relationships
involved in their first contact, which was about potential interference,
described here by Alan:
What [SATNet] basically said to us was, "could you change the
channel please?" But they didn't ask us, they told their customer who
happened to be our customer's landlord. Who then told his brother-in-
law, who was our customer. It was the brother-in-law who finally
introduced both parties.
Surprisingly, it turned out that SATNet was also receiving a substantial
government subsidy to provide service to Planetree Forest in competition
with TownNet. SATNet may have received as much as about USD $30,000
from a different agency at a different level of government (from a fund for
the promotion of local businesses).
To reconcile this competing use of public funds, the municipal
government asked both parties to come in for a voluntary meeting. Alan
reflected that:
At first [SATNet] tried to sell us equipment, a client device they had
built. [We didn't buy.] We initially signed a [non-disclosure
agreement] with them. We were going to work together. We came up
with this idea of sharing the spectrum. We said we'd use only a given
channel. We came up with a reasonable plan and they seemed happy at
the meeting.
A government official from the agency that gave TownNet the bulk of
their funding asked for a second meeting, intended to be a "technical
meeting" between the engineering staff of both groups. The second meeting
went badly, as Alan explained:
[SATNet] said, "We were here first, tough." Their stated objective was
to close the space down so that no one else could move in. Part of the
agreement was that they'd provide us with a list of where we could use
what channel and we would provide a list of what areas we had
covered. That agreement has sat in abeyance. They [didn't] do
anything and we haven't changed anything.
56. SATNet provided a speed of 512 Kbps for about USD $24.99 per month, and
served eight towns in Planetree Forest. TownNet offered comparable service to sixteen
towns (including eight towns also served by SATNet), with a speed of 512 Kbps for about
USD $29.99 per month and 1 Mbps for $82.99 per month.
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Worried, Alan of TownNet then posted to a mailing list for coordination
between WISPs. His post read in part:
I think we're going to have a problem with spectrum issues. Does
anybody have any advice on arbitration over use of channels? These
people won't negotiate-it's likely to end up in court.
SATNet forwarded Alan's post to TownNet's funding agency with the
addendum: "This guy's a troublemaker."
B. From Negotiation to Jamming
By this point, TownNet and SATNet had an antagonistic relationship,
to be sure, but antagonism should not necessarily be worrying. They are
competitors requiring the same resource (part of the 2.4 GHz band) that
they both saw as scarce. Next, according to Philip, SATNet's strategy for
winning changed to enforcement of a first-come, first-served model of the
band, and the instrument used changed from negotiation to technology.
Philip elaborated:
When we moved one [TownNet] link to 300 yards and crossed two of
their long links we found that we couldn't do anything. We stick up an
antenna and do Netstumbler and get a long list of [SATNet] out there.
[Before], we were picking channels that were well separated, the noise
floor appeared nice and quiet, and [now] at a matter of a few hundred
yards with line of sight we couldn't see a thing. There was no signal,
nothing. . . . Then customers started to complain that their own
[indoor] home networks stopped working.... So [the regulator] in the
end started some sort of investigation.
This mysterious failure of all of the open spectrum to be open occurred just
after a number of relevant developments in the larger Wi-Fi engineering
community.
First, widespread publicity appeared about wireless Internet's newly
discovered susceptibility to "logical" jamming. Briefly, digital wireless
systems use a "listen before talking" procedure to reduce the chance that a
transmission will collide with one from another station. For example, the
equipment used by TownNet and SATNet employ Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) that includes a process
called "clear channel assessment." When a wireless card performs a clear
channel assessment as a prelude to "talking," if another station is
transmitting, the card will wait a "backoff' interval and then perform the
assessment again." Researchers noticed that directing a wireless card to
transmit a continuous pattern of bits will cause all other devices within
range to always conclude that the channel is busy, and wait indefinitely.58
57. Chris Wullems et al., A Trivial Denial of Service Attack on IEEE 802.11 Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum Wireless LANs, in WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS SYMPOSIUM
129, 131 (2004).
58. Vulnerability Note VU#106678: IEEE 802.11 Wireless Network Protocol DSSS
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Similarly, simple scripts appeared on the World Wide Web at this time that
allowed a wireless device to "use" all of its available capacity by
transmitting nonsense. Rumors were also flying in the wireless community
about new equipment proposed by manufacturers that would increase the
speed of data transmission by using all of the available channels
simultaneously across multiple bands, using multiple radio chipsets.
Finally, online discussion boards reported that commercial
telecommunications carriers had begun to raise the transmission power on
their equipment to nearer the legal maximum,6o presumably to drown out
competing signals. It is not clear what exactly happened to the open
spectrum in Planetree Forest in 2004, but Alan is convinced that:
They were over power. [SATNet] was using amplifiers. There are a
number of technologies that cause denial of service that are actually
very difficult to pinpoint and I'm ... convinced that they were using
something. They really didn't like competing with anybody. [They
thought,] "The more channels I grab means the less competition."
C. From Jamming to Extortion
At this point, the municipal government asked TownNet and SATNet
to return for a third of what Alan called (with a chuckle) "these arbitration-
confrontation meetings." This time they also invited an outside mediator,
and Alan said the SATNet tactic moved from jamming to extortion:
We agreed that [SATNet] would let us use channel one and they'd use
the rest. He went away with this agreement but he had this list of
[other] demands still in place. He wanted us to pay for reconfiguring
their network. [He said] we were going to pay them [thousands of
dollars] to implement the changes that were necessary.
Even after the agreement, nothing changed immediately, until a few days
later. Alan said, "[O]n the day the regulator knocked on their door, that all
stopped and suddenly our customer[s' equipment] burst into life." Alan and
Philip explained that both SATNet and TownNet were found to be using
Taiwanese equipment that was not certified for operation in the country,
and had secondary harmonics in a licensed band (thereby violating
CCA Algorithm Vulnerable to Denial of Service, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS
TEAM, DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/106678 (last visited Feb.
23, 2011); see Wullems, supra note 57, at 131.
59. For instance, rumors were that Sony's proposed "Hi-Bit Wireless" strategy for
consumer electronics would involve multiple simultaneous Wi-Fi channels (and therefore
multiple radios) in the same device. See, e.g., Sony Air Board in March, AKIBALIVE (Jan.
19, 2004), http://web.archive.org/web/20080105114258/http://www.akibalive.com/
archives/000514.htmi.
60. See, e.g., John Foust, 2 Wire and SBC Interference?, BAY AREA WIRELESS USERS
GROUP MAILING LIST (Jan. 20, 2004), http://www.mail-
archive.com/wireless@lists.bawug.org/msg05848.html; John Foust, Re: SBC Routinely
Installing 2 Wire 400 mW AP/FW, BAY AREA WIRELESS USERS GROUP MAILING LIST (Apr.
21, 2004), http://www.mail-archive.com/wireless@lists.bawug.org/msg06334.html.
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certification laws and causing harmful interference in an easily detectible
way). While charges of jamming-especially by denial of service using
random or nonsense traffic-would be almost impossible to prove, luckily
the fact that they both bought very cheap uncertified equipment over the
Internet gave a national regulatory official the reason to inspect the
premises, and all interference then disappeared. Both TownNet and
SATNet have continued to compete, but with no interference. Both
providers were warned about the uncertified equipment and stopped using
it. There were no formal legal sanctions.
D. Primacy ofLocal Versus National Sources ofAdjudication
Local ties interconnect all aspects of TownNet's story. A local
government employee was one of the founding members, and they were
able to secure free access to antenna locations and some development
money (at least the initial zero-interest loan) in part through existing
relationships in the community where they lived. But one relationship not
yet discussed is essential to understanding this case, and that is the one
between the TownNet founders and the official who worked for the
national communications regulator. The official also lived in Planetree
Forest and wanted broadband in his community; after meeting the founders
at an early public organizing meeting about broadband, they became
friendly.
"He's very professional. But he does keep us informed," Alan noted.
Philip seconded, "He has access to spectrum analyzers and all those kinds
of things; we used to regularly bring him in because getting a hold of that
stuff is expensive."
In another context, Alan explained, "He compartmentalizes his advice
as well. Sometimes it was a formal warning." Philip added, "He still gives
us quite a lot of technical help."
With this relationship in the foreground, the fact that the regulatory
official, "in the end started some sort of investigation," shifts in meaning.
At first glance, Alan and Philip successfully and justly defended
themselves against a variety of assaults-requests to change frequencies,
demands for outrageous payments, jamming of the airwaves. Their
successful defense "in the end" required the mobilization of central state
authority, which looms as a final arbiter after more local systems of order
fail in adjudication. At second glance, Alan and Philip are well-connected
local experts who are already enmeshed in the apparatus of the state at a
variety of levels: through grants, their own board of directors, and their
acquaintance with a federal enforcement officer. Their competitor is "run
from out of town rather than here," "has just come from the outside," and is
"notorious" because of earlier suggestions of dishonesty. He "has a
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reputation," and is "not in it for the community." His character can be
judged by poor engineering decisions (his network is bridged), poor results
(his network is high latency), and a lack of manual skill (he cannot do his
own crimping).6' Rephrased, his network is simple, slow, and he cannot
connect two wires together. Led by a nontechnical profiteer and outsider,
SATNet had already been "selected for failure," 62 and all that remained was
to decide the venue for the defeat and choose its justification. The outcome
was decided by these measures of SATNet's character, and the federal
enforcement action was not a last resort when local measures failed, but
was itself an implementation of the local decision. That is, SATNet was
first and foremost not a violator of national spectrum allocation and
certification rules through the use of uncertified equipment. Instead,
SATNet was first and foremost (in Alan's words), "a bad neighbor." Even
though both networks were warned, only one network was triumphant and
TownNet was delighted with the result.
The Planetree Forest case does not force a choice between two
competing conceptions of regulation-it is not true that this incident must
either indicate that the federal government is the resolution for intractable
local disputes, or that it is the expression of local decisions about character.
Both of these can be true, even within the same case. To cement which of
these is more in play in this particular incident, let us close this case study
with Philip's observation about the role of government in the regulation of
the spectrum. Reflecting on the successful (for them) conclusion of the
TownNet versus SATNet confrontation, Philip stated, "Part of the problem
with a lot of regulators is that they're too heavy with the regulation. If
you're being a bad neighbor, someone needs to officially remind you that
you're being bad. No more than that."
Philip is not asking for more central control of the spectrum because
the force of SATNet's comeuppance was not derived from central
authority-enforcement was here a reminder of who could mobilize federal
enforcement on behalf of local norms and attach distant officialdom to their
victory. Of course, the quotation also restates the common notion that more
61. Bridged networks do not employ routing. Crimping is the process of connecting
wires and electrical connectors by deforming them with a tool called a crimper. Latency
refers to the time that elapses between a request for data and the beginning of data transfer.
62. "Selection for failure" is a concept introduced to legal anthropology by Moore to
explain the action of multiple cultural dimensions that underpins some legal reasoning.
Specifically, selection for failure has come to mean the process by which a party is
culturally prejudged to lose or win in adjudication. The role of the law in these situations is
then to externally rationalize and justify a decision arrived at much earlier, rather than to
make any new decisions. See Sally Falk Moore, Selection for Failure in a Small Social
Field: Ritual Concord and Fraternal Strife Among the Chagga, Kilimanjaro, 1968-69, in
SYMBOL AND POLmcs IN COMMUNAL IDEOLOGY 109 (Sally Falk Moore & Barbara G.
Myerhoffeds., 1975).
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regulation is always bad. That is, regulators can never win, even when they
can win your broadcast war.
V. CONCLUSION
It is worth remembering that "new laws are thrust upon going social
arrangements in which there are complexes of binding obligations already
in existence. ... The social arrangements are often effectively stronger than
the new laws."6 There is no doubt that large national telecommunications
carriers have complexes of binding obligations and ongoing social
arrangements, but there are not that many of them. In counterpoint, a more
open electromagnetic spectrum policy and the appearance of the
Jeffersonian ideal of free competition between decentralized small
enterprises like these WISPs have combined to produce an eruption of
thousands of local spectrum confrontations where users with a wide variety
of backgrounds and skill levels wrestle with new wireless technology,
spectrum laws, and each other.
In these cases, we have seen that the engineer's allegiance to
principles of engineering as a profession can be far stronger than any
allegiance to communications regulation, and that even as engineers they
have an allegiance to their system that is much stronger than any to the
system. Similarly, it could be said that TownNet was the injured party in
the Planetree Forest spectrum war-at least if jamming occurred-but
relationships with members of the Planetree Forest community and a
national regulatory official were critical in bringing the war to a resolution,
whereas the facts of the dispute were not so critical. (Recall that SATNet
was not charged with jamming anything.) Engineers in the field and
regulators in the government disagreed as to whether a portion of
unlicensed spectrum was empty or full, with all of the engineers in these
two cases seeking unopposed access to a non-overlapping channel. In
addition, these users of telecommunications laws "knew" the spectrum by
both reading the law and using a free software program (Netstumbler).6 4
The software program and some of the particularities of its design were
very influential in seeing the spectrum as "full," in effect becoming the
electromagnetic spectrum's user interface.
A. The New Role of the License-Exempt Regulator
This Article opened by posing questions about the future of open
spectrum. No evidence found so far in these two cases or in the larger
63. MooRE, supra note 2, at 58.
64. While MonroeMesh only used Netstumbler in this case, TownNet "knew" the
spectrum both through Netstumbler and by carefully monitoring the performance
characteristics of its wireless network.
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research project suggests that open spectrum will fail due to a tragedy of
the commons. In several instances described here, engineers have been
extremely overcautious in predicting the failure of unlicensed spectrum due
to congestion. While this potential congestion has been something of an
obsession, it has yet to appear. These engineers, like the MonroeMesh
group, were sometimes unwilling to develop unlicensed systems because of
a misapprehension that the mere existence of other users (inferred via
802.11 b beacons) implied actual or imminent congestion. In one instance
described-the alleged Planetree Forest jamming that occurred over a
period of weeks in 2004-the spectrum appeared to be "actually" full, in
that TownNet's equipment would not work in one area of Planetree Forest.
However, this was an instance of aggression, not overgrazing (or
congestion)-a critical difference.
Practically, this empirical evidence suggests that widespread use of
wireless without licenses intimates a new kind of relationship with the
electromagnetic spectrum. Regulators have never conceptualized the
spectrum as something that has a user interface, and telecommunications
policy research has never particularly focused on messy local situations.
Nonetheless, the larger study of WISPs in six countries finds that whenever
you have a local WISP, you have a local situation. Examples abound of
local spectrum coordination and negotiation. These negotiations have
occasionally turned hostile, as negotiations do, but this does not indicate a
failure of negotiation. It is this image of spectrum use that regulators will
find increasingly useful. Within the enforcement bureaus of the world, it is
common to think that determining a source of unlicensed interference is a
probably impossible task, but this is true only if the entity trying to do so is
an enforcement bureau. Local providers have an intimate knowledge of
what goes on on the rooftops of their town-and even what goes on inside.
Mechanisms like searchable public databases in bands where registration is
required would also aid local coordination, and WISPs have tried to set up
their own databases for this purpose where registration is not required. A
more clearly defined and promulgated set of unlicensed norms would also
be a benefit. If under "open spectrum" models the government is not going
to go away, this indicates a much increased role for enforcement (of, for
example, certification, certification violations, and jamming) and public
education (usually only weakly attempted by national regulators). This
obviously implies more work: the unlicensed regulator is entering into this
new relationship with a much larger number of local users.
B. Embedding Spectrum Negotiation in Software Will Not Change
This Situation
It is tempting to conclude that the kinds of choices made by the
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groups discussed in this Article result only from temporary lags in wireless
technology. An argument in this vein might say that if in the future the
negotiations for available spectrum (e.g., the choice of channel) are fixed in
software algorithms, these local wireless providers will have nothing to talk
about, and "broadcast wars" will go away. (Or, they will go away again.)
Benkler hopes for as much by framing the problem of interference as one
for product manufacturers to sort out in a world without carriers.
However, for a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this Article, one may
also argue that carriers are unlikely to vanish. In that case, removing a
decision from human agency to software algorithm simply changes the
tools available to carriers-it is no balm for their desire to both operate in
license-exempt bands and at the same time have some control over their
operating situation. The promise of new configurability and user-driven
innovation is one of the reasons that unlicensed is attractive in the first
place. Restricting the parameters that users can manipulate to build new
services via some prior specification of algorithms (or requiring secrecy
that discourages users from writing their own algorithms) runs exactly
counter to the overall project of unlicensed. Indeed, it precludes the
innovation these new bands are supposed to produce.
C The Future of the Approach "From Below "
This may be a historical moment when the study of
telecommunications policy critically needs to pay attention to the law as it
is lived. Unlike some other domains of law, communications policymakers
and researchers have often assumed that the law is never particularly
"operative" (Moore's term) in the lives of everyday people. Arcane
communications rules are written for a small audience of industry insiders.
In a magazine parody, a political writer noted that this culture in U.S.
telecommunications policy was so insular it should be called "FCC World,"
and that it has "perhaps five thousand denizens.' Just after that article
appeared in Spring 2003, that sort of thinking was jolted by an FCC vote on
the relaxation of media ownership caps.69 While the topic of media
ownership caps is usually considered arcane, a record-breaking two million
e-mails, telephone calls, and faxes poured into the FCC about it.70 The
65. See generally Benkler, supra note 19.
66. See generally ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).
67. See generally Christian Sandvig et al., Hidden Interfaces to "Ownerless Networks,"
Presented to the 32nd Conference on Communication, Information, and Internet Policy
(2004) (unpublished paper), http://research.niftyc.org/HiddenInterfaces.pdf.
68. Nicholas Lemann, The Chairman, NEW YORKER, Oct. 7, 2002.
69. For a summary, see Press Release, FCC, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration
(June 2, 2003), http://fallfoss.fcc.gov/edecs_public/attachmatch/DOC-235047Al.pdf.
70. See, e.g., Comments in FCC Media Bureau Docket 02-277, 2002 Biennial
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surprise for many analysts was that it was possible at all for two million
people to become aware that administrative regulation on media ownership
existed in the first place. This increasingly active public, recent consumer
protection efforts, and liberalization of the electromagnetic spectrum are all
reinforcing trends. For instance, consider the new availability of wireless
devices that do not require licenses in many countries; the new regime of
low power FM licenses from the FCC; the use of a non-exclusive "light-
license" of f1 per year for some wireless broadband services (with a simple
online form) by the U.K. Office of Communications;7' and the creation of
an online National Do Not Call Registry by the U.S. Federal Trade
72Commission. These are examples of situations in which much larger
numbers of people are now expected to be aware of and interact with an
administrative regulator in fairly unprecedented ways. The public is more
active in arcane venues (where it perhaps is not welcomed by insiders),
while at the same time new federal decisions (presumably endorsed by
insiders) about things like telephone privacy now presuppose the
participation of every citizen of the country in an administrative regulation.
In this environment, we need more attention to the law as it is lived, and
users of telecommunications as users of telecommunications law. In this,
theoretical frameworks like Moore's theory of law as process are valuable
tools.73
While parts of this Article have described events that are somewhat
sensational by the standards of telecommunications policy, the future of
"open spectrum" remains bright. In that spirit, the Article will close with
one final return to the city of Monroe and to Planetree Forest. While these
case studies describe a variety of different actors and events, there are
many things wireless engineers will always agree on. In fact, when asked to
describe the biggest problems facing wireless communication, no one
mentioned congestion or regulation. Dave of MonroeMesh sighed and
replied wistfully, "If only we got another tall building." A year later in
Regulatory Review-Review of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Comments in
FCC Media Bureau Docket 01-235, Cross Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Ownership;
Comments in FCC Media Bureau Docket 01-317, Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple
Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets; Comments in FCC Media Bureau
Docket 00-244, Definition of Radio Markets; see also Lemann, supra note 68.
71. This applies to fixed stations in 5 GHz Band C (5725 to 5850 MHz). "Light
licensing" generally refers to the ability to obtain a non-exclusive license, pay a nominal
licensing fee, or receive automatic license approval (also called "registration"), or all of
these. See Section 1, OFCOM, http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-
research/telecoms-research/bbresearch/wireless update/wirelessbroadband/section1 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2011).
72. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of
199 1, Report and Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 14014, para. 28 (2003).
73. See generally MOORE, supra note 2.
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Planetree Forest, the reply was also quick: The biggest problem? "It's the
trees."
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